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I. INTRODUCTION 
F or many rural dwellers in Zambia, as well as elsewhere in 
Africa, the movement toward independence represented an attempted 
movement toward a higher standard of living, The displacement of the 
colonial authorities and the installation of an African government repre­
sented a shift from a public order whose primary interest was the main­
tenance of law and order in the rural areas to a government which had 
come to power by promising to fulfill the demands of the indigenous 
peoples that they be made better off. As a result of the commitments. 
made in the bid for power, out of a regard for its future fate at.the polls, 
and .because of its genuine regard for the welfare of its citizens, the 
new Zambian government, like other governments in Africa, initiated 
programs designed to upgrade the standard of living of its basically 
rural constituents. Utilizing the revenues generated by the prosperous 
mining industry, the government constructed, staffed, and provisioned 
schools; hospitals, and clinics in the rural areas at a ra.te unprecedented 
in the history pf the territory, And, of greater relevance to this study, 
it initiated programs des.igned to enhance the cash-earning opportunities 
of the villagers. Toward this end, the new governmen� spomiored the 
growth of larming cooperatives and the formation of peasant farms i n  
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the r ural areas, seeking thereby to share the benefits of independence 
by increasing the incomes of its rural citizens, 
The Village Setting 
In this essay, we analyze the experience of one village group 
called Kasumpa village -- and the response of its residents to the 
government's rural development program. Kasumpa village is located 
in the Luapula Province of Zambia, and lies some two miles inland 
from the Luapula River which forms the boundary between Zambia and 
the Katanga Province of Zaire. Like many of the villages in the Luapula 
valley, the village was settled by immigrants, In the case of Kasumpa, 
the immigrants were Bemba who had been recruited into the valley by 
Mwata Kazembti, the chief of the Lunda, the dominant ethnic group of 
the area. By recruiting Bemba warriors, Mwata sought to fortify his 
Lunda kingdom against the encroachments of marauding slave traders. 
From the late nineteenth century until the early 1900' s, the Bemba 
warriors remained in the valley virtually as guests of the Lunda chief; 
they paid fealty to their own chief, Mwabamukupa, rather than being. 
subjugated directly to the Lunda kingship. With the establishment of 
the Pax Britannica, however, slave raiding abated and with it, need 
for protection, Mwata Kazembe was therefore willing to risk the 
disaffection of his former military defenders, .and so he displaced 
Mwabamukupa, the chief of the Bemba, and appointed a Lunda to govern 
the Bemba community. The headman's.name was Kasumpa, and as 
is the custom in Central Africa, the village took his name, 
Kasumpa Village numbers approximately 5 00 households, 
These households run in a line along what was formerly ·the main road 
between the district capital of Kawambwa and the road along the floor 
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of the Luapula valley. Each maintains a garden of groundnuts, pumpkins, 
and sometimes tobacco in the village itself; but the principal fields are 
maintained within one mile of the village, and concentrate along the banks 
of nearby streams. In these outlying fields, the villagers grow the 
principal staple -- cassava -- which they interplant with maize and cu­
curbits. The second major staple, groundnuts, they grow in adjacent 
fields, along with occasional patches of "European vegetables": tomatoes, 
cabbages, and onions, Many families also· possess fruit trees, either 
in the village itself or bordering on the gardens outside the village. 
Kasumpa lies at the intersection of two perennial streams, 
and the extensive "river margin" contains soils of very high quality; 
villagers frequently point with pride to the luxuriant grass that grows 
in the . area as a sign of the quality of their land; agricultural ecologists 
have recognized these valley soils as being among the lands of greatest 
fertiiity in Zambia. 1 In working the soils, the villagers utilize a mound 
type of agricultural system. Late in the dry season, which runs roughly 
from June until October, they break the soil with hoes and work it into 
a series of ridges. In these they place cassava cuttings and the seeds 
which they have maintained from the previous year's harvests. With 
the onset of the rains, the villager's devote their efforts· to weeding and 
spacing and to guarding the crops against .the depredations of wild animals. 
They also plant vegetables at the onset of the dry season and harvest 
these prior to the ·rains. During the harvests, the villagers labor 
intensively to recover and store their crops and to prevent spoilage. 
While both men and women work in the fields, the men concentrate their 
labor at the beginning and .the end of the agricultural cycle -- at the 
time of the breaking of the soils and at the time of the harvests, The 
women's work is . more evenly distributed and centers around the 
building of the mounds; weeding, and harvesting as well. 
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The vast majority of the villagers farm in the manner which 
has been described, There are, however, some variants to the·system. 
Some villagers supplement their mound gardens with chltemene gardens, 
in which they use ash from the branches of. pollarded trees to fertilize 
their soils. This supplement appears to be characteristic of gardens 
located away from the rivers and near the fores ts, and is of relatively 
minor importance in the area. More significant is a second major 
variant of the prevailing agricultural system: that of cash-crop farming. 
Ten families f.rom Kasumpa village have withdrawn from the village 
and set themselves up on farms about a mile and a half from the village;
another thirty families formed into two cooperative societies and commenced 
producing in the same area. Both the farmers and cooperative members 
supplement their "traditional gardens" with commercial plots on which 
they grow maize, a variety of vegetables, sugar cane, and bananas, 
Most of the farms and both the cooperative societies started after 
independence and are the result of the new government's promotion of cash­
crop farming in this highly fertile area. 
Our interest in this essay is to explore the response of the 
members of Kasumpa village to the government's programs 'of agricultural 
development. Our primary thesis is that agricultural development, 
political protest, · and rural emigration are interdependent phenomena. 
Thus, we contend that attempts by the government to upgrade rural 
income through programs of agricultural development haye largely 
failed, and that in response to this failure, the Kasumpa villagers 
have participated in movements of political dissent and have sought 
private solutions to the problem of low rural incomes by entering the 
urban market for labor, 
The Ecological and Cultural Setting 
Our secondary thesis is that the response of the Kasumpa 
villagers has been largely conditioned by the ecological and cultural 
constraints within which they seek to enhance their standards of 
living, Thus, we contend, the ecological setting within which they 
have sought higher incomes through farming, in conformity with 
the government's rural development effort, has nearly guaranteed 
that farming would fail. Ecologically, while the area is fertile and 
well watered, its primary characteristic is its remoteness from the 
copper deposits of Zambia and thus from the major urban markets 
for food: Kasumpa is over 2.00 miles from Mufulira, the nearest 
copperbelt town. Urban consumers and distributors have been able 
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to purchase produce from nearer farmers at lower cost, and so prior 
to the government's rural development effort, private markets for 
agricultural produce hardly functioned in the area of Kasumpa village; 
the market simply did not penetrate that fai:. More recently, the 
remoteness of the area has meant that the public agencies created 
as a part of the development program, rather than private markets, 
have shaped the operations of the farms, with the result that profits 
have not been made. 
A second e·cological characteristic of great importance is 
the infestation of the area with tsetse fly. The presence of the 
fly has s.eriously constrained the transformation from subsistence 
to peasant farming;· for not only have the villagers lacked cattle for 
sale, but also, they have lacked the means of motive power by which­
to farm more 
.
extensively and a primary source of cheap fertilizers 
by which to farm more intensively as well, It is not by chance ·that 
the most prosperous peasant farming areas in Zambia have been 
those with cattle; and the history of the rise of peasant farming. in 
the territory can be written in terms of the transformation of cattle 
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into farming assets by adopting manuring, forage rotations, scotch­
carts, and ploughs. But in the area of Kasumpa village, the presence 
of tsetse has forced those who seek higher inco.mes through the govern­
ment's sponsorship of cash-crop farming to operate without cattle, 
and therefore with lower acreages and lower output per farm than 
would otherwise be the case. 
Culturally,· the Kasumpa villagers have been affected by
attitudes and practices which they have acquired in their previous 
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history, and which today still influence their responses and behavior. 
One set of atti.tudes was first generated in the nineteenth century, and 
derives from what can be called the villagers' "myth of origin. " As 
we have seen, the villagers first entered the valley at the request of 
the Lunda and as their equals and, indeed, as their protectors; prior to 
the displacement of their chief in the 1920's, the villagers lacked any 
previous history of domination by the Lunda. An important res ult was 
that when the nationalist movement entered the valley in the 1950's, 
the Kasumpa villagers were at the forefront of the attacks upon the 
primary agency of the colonial government in the area, the Lunda 
Superior Native Authority; and this in turn has meant in the post­
independence era that the Kasumpa villagers have high expectations 
of economic rewards from the government which they feel that they 
helped put. into power. As a result of this political history, as we 
shall see, the relationship between the fate of the gove
.
rnment's rural 
development programs and the tenden<;y for political dissent is closely 
drawn in the case of this village grouping. 
A second cultural "residue" that influences the response 
of the Kasumpa villagers is their long history of urban exposure. 
From the time of the opening of the Katanga mines in the first· 
decade of the twentieth ·century, Kasumpa villagers have journeyed 
forth in s earch of employment. When the villagers now speak of 
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gaining an income, they are often describing an economic situation 
iri which they are wc:rking for someone else and thereby drawing 
regular, pr'edictable, and immediate economic rewards for their labor, 
analagous to the monthly wages which they derived from urban employ­
ment. This "traditional" orientation toward earning a living has, as 
we shall see, strongly affected their response to the opportunities 
created by the government's cooperative program. 
A third major element in the cultural heritage of the villagers -­
and the last of major importance to this essay -- is the extended family. 
As we shall see, in attempting to cope with rural impoverishment, the 
,;_illagers utilize their network of kin relations as a means of extracting 
wealth from the urban sector, ·and in this manner seek a private solution 
to the failure of public programs to generate earnings in the rural 
sector. 
With these theses in mind, we can now turn to the substance of' 
this study. We begin with an analysis of the major, alternative sources 
of rural income in Kasumpa village. These include political work in 
the governing party, membership in the cooperatives, and work on 
the farms. We analyze the reasons for the in1poverishn1ent of these 
gove·rnmentally sponsored alternatives. And we then move on to 
examine the response of the villagers to· their failure to generate 
3 significantly enhanced economic returns. 
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II. INCOME OPPORTUNITIES SPONSORED BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The Political Party 
At first glance, it may appear strange to regard political 
work as a significant source of . income, But, an analysis of the origins 
and history of the nationalist movement in the Luapula valley strongly 
suggests that people entered political activity and supported the indi-
genous political parties in an attempt to enhance their economic standing. 
The commitment to political activity was a strong one. The Luapula 
v alley was an area in which political organizers trans for ined nationalist 
protest into insurgency, and only by importing mobile police and armed forces 
from the urban areas did' the colonial authorities curtail the violence 
which broke out in the area in the early 1960' s. What was the motivation 
for this impassioned support of the nationalist -movement? 
There were, of course, many reasons. The people were in 
rebellion against .the misuse of power by the chiefs; this was important, 
and particularly in Kc.surnpa village where the authority of the Lunda 
chiefs, as we have seen, was established only recently and, even then, 
without extinguishing the historical loyalties to the Bemba prince that had 
led his warriors into the area. Another reason was the genuine and 
profound hatred of foreign rule. The people wanted to be free of 
foreign domination and were grieved and angry at finding themselves 
in what they experienced as a position of slavery. But there were other 
reasons for their support of the nationalist movement, and these were 
economic in nature. 
A fundamentally economic reason was the hatred of taxes. 
More than perhaps anything else in the ru1�al areas, the nationalist 
movement was a rebellion against having to pay levies to the government, 
Each year every person judged to be over eighteen had to pay a head 
tax to the colonial government. The tax in many ways was 
inequitable, It was ·as great for those with families as it was 
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for single men; and those with jobs and a steady source of cash 
income paid the same taxes as those who were living as subsistence 
cultivators. The native authority levied further taxes -- for bicycle 
licences, dog licenses, hunting permits and permits for brewing 
beer, And the public officials also levied fines -- for improper 
thatch on houses, .for failing to build drying racks to keep household 
utensils off the ground, and for failing to dig latrines to the specified 
depths, for example. The hatred of public levies is perhaps best 
captured in the following narrative of a senior resident of Kasumpa 
village. 
First the messengers of the chief came to our village and 
told us the day that the District Commissioner would come to inspect 
the village and to collect the taxes. All the people of the village 
were to be in the village on that day. They were not to go to 
their fields, They were to wash themselves and their clothes 
for that day and they were to learn songs, Then the District Com­
missioner would come.  He would camp near the village; his 
messengers would use a house in the village, and the people· 
would have to sleep elsewhere. His messengers would take 
him eggs and chickens froth the village, and the owners would 
be paid a very small price, even though he was paid a salary 
by the government. 
When the District Commissioner at last entered the village, we 
would form lines. We would. clap and cheer and sing what his messen­
gers had said was his favorite song. We put on our happy faces. 
Then the District Commissioner would come pushing his bicyclE. and. 
he would wave as if he were happy to see us, but letting us know that 
he was only seeming to be so as he was our superior. 
Then he would put up a shelter and take the personal levy. If 
we did not pay it, we went to jail. Then he inspected the houses 
and the latrines and saw if tJ:iere were drying racks to keep the dishes 
off the ground. If there was poor thatch, pah!, you paid a five 
shilling fine, A poor latrine, pah!, five shillings. The fines 
and the taxes continued, even though you may have no work. 
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During all this, we had to stand, We 'feared if our children cried, 
It was forbidden to sit until you were· told to do so, Then, · you 
had to sit. One man from the town was here with a new suit on, 
He refused to sit on the ground because his suit was clean, The 
District Commissioner shouted at him for being insolent. The 
messengers made him.carry the District Commissioner's tent on 
his tour for the next two weeks, even though he had only five weeks 
leave in the village to visit with his family. 
The villagers simply hated being coerced into making payments 
to the government. Adding to the problem was that the residents were 
convinced that the services they received from the government did not 
adequately compensate them for the income which they contributed for 
its maintenance, Law and order under foreign rule was simply not 
worth the price. Significantly, the villagers marked the highpoint of 
the nationalist rebellion by burning their tax booklets; and they did 
this just prior to banding into small bands of guerilla fighters and 
commencing the violent struggle against the colonial regime, 
The second economic reason for supporting the nationalist 
movement was that the people expected material benefits from their 
s�pport of ·the nationalist cause. The ·leaders of the movement expected 
promotions and jobs; for many, their objective was to hold public posts, 
with the salaries, offices, and perquisites which they knew were given 
to those who held positions in government, The followers expected 
that by putting their own leaders in positions of power, they 
would secure benefits from them. The politicians, of course, played 
upon these beliefs in order to secure power. They promised that there 
would be schemes in the rural areas -- farming schemes, cooperative 
schemes, goat schemes, and schemes for. marketing the oranges, bananas, 
and mangoes that grew in the area. They promised that they would bring 
industries to the rural areas and that there would be widespread employ­
ment. A cannery would tin the fish from the nearby rivers and the fruits 
from the banana and mango tr.ees. Surely the soils of the Luapula 
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contained the same minerals that had made the copperbelt rich, and, 
after independence, these would be explored, developed, and worked. 
In the press and the bulletins issued by the nationalist politicians, and 
still kept in the houses of many Kasumpa villagers, the politicians 
urged the people to feel that given independence, the copperbelt would 
come to them instead of their having to go to the copperbelt, The 
people therefore felt that by supporting the nationalist movement, through 
votes, financial contributions, and physical suffering in the acts 
of violence that characterized political protest in this area, they 
could secure higher incomes with the coming of independence.
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For the leaders, the nationalist movement did pay. One 
former party leader is now a district governor in the Ministry of 
National Guidance, Another became an assistant district secretary in 
Mporokoso, and a third holds the same office in Samfya. In response 
to postindependence 'circulars which asked for the names of party 
leaders who merited rewards for their labors, other party officials 
were offered jobs in the government marketing agency; two now serve 
as security guards in the mechanical workshops in the district capital; 
and three others were given training and then employment as drivers 
of government vehicles. Most party leaders, however, remained in 
the village after independence, One served as a councillor in the 
Kawambwa Rural Council; there he part<?ok in the veritable pillage 
of the council treasury that led to the suspension of council activities 
within two years after independence. And others organized into 
farming cooperatives. Using their positions of political influence, 
they secured certificates of registration and literally thousands of 
kwacha in loans. Foilowing independence, the nationalist movement 
took care of its own. 
But for the present party leaders, the era of .promotions and 
payoffs has passed. Those· who fought the fight for freedom sought 
rewards for their sacrifices, · and they got them, But the present set 
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of leaders can expect no benefits of that kind. For those who 
see political work as a means for enhancing their material interests, 
the party is now a disappointing venture, 
The Cooperative Societies 
The farming cooperatives are the second publicly supported 
source of rural income, The Zambian government formed the cooperatives, 
at least in part, as a means of rewarding the rural dwellers for their 
sacrifices in the _nationalist struggle, The government announced the 
cooperative program at the first mass meeting between the rank and 
file party workers and the cabinet officials of the new government which 
they had helped to place in power. At the meeting, the President declared: 
The money is there and the know-how is there. You can form 
these cooperative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall 
assist you in getting on,5 
The party workers returned from this meeting to the villages and spread 
the news of the new government's program. In Zambia.as a whole, the 
number of cooperatives doubled in two years and quadrupled in·four. 6 
In Kasumpa village, the number rose from none to two, and the member­
ship from none to thirty. And in Kasumpa as elsewhere in Zambia, it 
was the local leadership of the nationalist movement that took .the inia­
tive in organizing, registering, and leading the farming cooperative, 
and thereby in realizing the benefits of independence. 
Office Holding 
in Partr 
TABLE 1 
Relationship Between Party Office-Holding 
and Office-Holding in the Cooperatives 
Main body 
Youth 
Constituency 
No Office 
Total 
Office Holding in Cooperatives 
Yes No 
4 
0 
3 
6 
13 
Chi Square 
Degrees of freedom 
Significance 
17 
8 
47 
73 
Does 
15. 69
6.00 
.oz 
Not Apply 
3 
2 
0 
14 
19 
13 
Total 
24 
10 
4 
67 
105 
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The government took several measures to underpin the cooperative 
societies. For one,_ it sought to provide the technical skills which were 
lacked by the subsistence producers. Thus, it provided training for the 
leadership of the cooperative societies in matters of management --
e.g., in record keeping and accounting -- and in directly productive 
skills -- planting, the application of fertilizers, and pest control. And 
it staffed the rural areas with extension workers: agricultural officers, 
who assisted the cooperative societies by advising them on farm methods, 
and cooperative officers, who advised the societies concerning their 
internal management and informed them about services provided by 
other departments. Secondly, the government sought to offs et the lack 
of productive power available to village producers by purchasing and 
distributing mechanical equipment. Thus, it distributed literally 
scores of tractors following independence, and stationed them at 
central depots in the rural districts. In Kawambwa district alone, 
whereas there had been but three tractors prior to 1964, within two 
years after independence, there were over twenty. 7 And the members 
of the cooperative societies now had, for the first time, the possibility 
of utilizing methods of cultivation other than the hoe, 
In two other ways, the government sought to promote the 
cooperative societies, First, it generated the funds through which 
the members could capitalize their. farming efforts, Thus, through 
capital provided by the Department of Co-operatives, and through loans 
made available by the Credit Organization of Zambia, the cooperative 
societies could hire laborers to clear new acreages (through stumping 
subsidies), maintain themselves and their families until the first crops 
were produced on the newly opened lands (through maintenance allowances), 
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and purchase the inputs necessary to commence production (through 
seasonal loans for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers and the hiring 
of tractor services). Lastly, the government sought to enhance the 
likelihood of the success of the cooperatives by creating a marketing 
service. Opening up small depots in the rural areas, and hiring staff 
and transport, the government sought to generate for the first time a 
large-scale demand for the output of village- level producers and to 
market the agricultural requisites which village farmers demanded. 
Through all of these measures, .the government hoped to insure that 
the cooperative societies would yield financial rewards and upgrade 
the standard of living of the village dwellers, 
In Kasumpa village, as elsewhere throughout much of rural 
Zambia, the cooperatives have failed. Using yields to ;3.Ssess their 
performance, the Kasumpa cooperatives achieved an average yield of 
5,0 standard bags of maize per acre in 1971, in comparison with a 
national average for commercial farmers of approximately 20 bags 
per acre and a national average for subsistence producers around 5.1 
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bags. Similar differences arise in the case of groundnuts and 
vegetables, Applying financial· measures to assess performance of 
the cooperatives yields an equally dismal assessment, for both 
cooperatives ran at a loss; the best measure of their losses is the 
extent of their indebtedness, for the generous loans advanced by the 
government shortly after independence have now become a massive 
loan debt to the cooperative societies, Lastly, in 1972, the cooperatives 
simply ceased to function, Selling their farming requisites, the coopera­
tives have refused to plant and are now slated for "winding up" by the 
government, 
Even though we can be skeptical as to whether the cooperative 
form of agricultural production could work in any ca·se, this was not 
the basic reason for the failure of cooperative farming in Kasumpa. 
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Rather, two major reasons stand out, For one, the remoteness o f  Kasumpa 
village from major urban markets -- for capital, farming requisites, 
mechanical services, and transport -- meant that the operations of 
the cooperatives were dependent upon the performance of governmental 
bureaucracies, and these proved unreliable. And for another, the 
cooperative farn;iers defined their role as that of laborers in a govern­
mental enterprise. They worked so as to achieve short-term, regular 
rewards; arid their motivations led them first to misallocate their 
resources and then to turn away from cooperative farming altogether, 
The Effect of Remoteness 
Being remote from the urban areas, with their relative 
abundance of farm suppliers, credit institutions, transporters, and 
distributors, the cooperative societies in Kasumpa village depended 
entirely upon the governmental institutions for their f�rming needs, 
In order to operate successfully, the cooperatives had repeatedly to 
pass·through a sequence of bureaucratic hurdles. First, they had to 
secure loans from the government's credit organization so that they 
could purchase seeds and fertilizers and hire the tractor services, 
Once approved, the loan certificates had to be presented to the marketing 
agency so as to vouch for the payment of agricultural supplies. The key 
was to get the loan certificate early enough in the agricultural season so 
that the marketing agency could order enough of an inventory to 
provision the local cooperatives and do so in time to distribute its 
supplies prior to the onset bf the rains. Equally as important,' the 
loans had to be approved early enough in the season so that the coopera­
tive societies could rent tractor services in time to complete tilling and 
planting before the rains began. 
Being bureaucracies, the major governmental departments did 
not have to · compete nor did they particularly care about making a 
profit; even when enjoined by statute to be self-financing, the agencies 
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could always -- and did frequently -- turn to the public treasury 
as the source of their revenues. Lacking competition and the need 
to make a profit, the credit agency therefore had little incentive to 
get its loans out in time; the marketing agency had no financial 
incentive to make timely, or correct, deliveries fo·r see�s or ferti­
lizers; and the tractor drivers could arrive as much as two months 
late without fear that the cooperative farmers would have taken recourse 
to alternative providers of tractor services. The result was that the 
provisioning of credit, goods, and services took place in a manner 
that was devastating to the cooperatives. For example, in the 1970-71 
farm season, one cooperative had its loan approved in October and 
the other in mid-November, The rains began by mid-November, and 
this meant that the fields were unploughed at the time of the onset of the 
rains, While the seeds and fertilizers arrived on December 10, the 
tractor did not arrive until January 8. Even then, the tractor ran 
short of fuel and failed .to complete ploughing the acreage for which 
it had been contracted. The result for one cooperative was that of 
the 50 acres which it had planned to plant, it in fact planted 7; and 
of the Kl65 that was realized from the sale of produce, K50.48 was 
applied to interest and the remainder to principle of an outstanding 
9 
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loan debt of K3 l 05, 'i'he farmers were left with nothing for their 
efforts. While I was unable to get accurate figures for the other 
cooperative, the impression was vividly left that for them, the situation 
was the same. 
The Effects of Motivation 
Adding to the downfall of the cooperative societies was· the 
motivation of, its members. The members sought immediate, short­
term rewards for their wo-.:·k in the cooperatives, There were two major 
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reasons for this. For one, they regarded the cooperatives as economic 
rewards for the time, pain, and effort which they had devoted to the 
movement of national liberation, and they wanted their rewards in 
immediate and tangible form. For another, the members' image of 
an economic relationship was one based upon their experiences in 
town. Rather tha,n aspiring to being economically self-sustaining, 
they aspired to the status of paid employees, And rather than future 
profits, they wanted present income. These motivations occasioned 
a series of decisions which disrupted cooperative farming, 
One consequence of their motivations was that the cooperative 
m'embers expended time and effort on activities which yielded immediate 
benefits, regardless of their long-term consequences for profits. 
Thus, for example, the government paid a subsidy of K30 per acre 
for stumping new lands. As a result, both cooperatives chose to 
locate in the forested areas, where they could clear new lands and 
receive the subsidy, rather than on the river margins, where the 
land required no clearing but did possess superior soils and an abundant 
supply of water, In addition, rather than growing produce, the 
cooperatives continued to clear new acreage: one, for example, by 
1972 had cleared 100 acres, while planting only 15, inspiring one 
cooperative officer to· write: "They should have a farm of crops, not 
grass.1110 
In addition, the members of the cooperative societies applied 
immense pres
.
sure upon the government to release their loan .money, 
not so as to invest in supplies and farm requisites, but rather to pay 
them "for their labor. 11 Thus, for example, the chai.rman .of one oi 
the two cooperatives wrote a local government official saying that the 
members had threatened him, telling him that "If you are not going 
to pay us, we shall go to the court of law to report or summon you." 
The chairman went on to write that he could no longer "sleep in his 
house" but rather "sleeps in the jungle fo.r • . .  fear of being attacked 
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during the night time. 11
11 
In later days, he joined his members in 
their demands for a cash payout of their loan money, writing: 
We are demanding money for our fields and many people have 
run away from the co-operatives because of lacking money. 
They are saying that we shall come back when we receive 
money for the field. That is why we shall go to the office to 
look for money .. . .  One part for weeding and one part to 
buy our food. . . . The other money will be shared among 
ourselves to buy clothes. There can not be a job without any 
wages.12 
The presure for money became so intense that in 1972 the chairman, 
rather than using the farm supplies for growing, actually sold the 
seed and fertilizer, claiming that the proceeds represented "the 
rewards for independence." Needless to say, following the sale, the 
members of the cooperative did not plant, save subsistence gardens. 
Stumping, rather than planting; taking their loans in the 
form of "wages, 11 rather than capital goods; and converting farm 
assets into spendable cash -- all these decisions led to higher present 
income, but were detrimental to the establishment of the cooperatives 
as independent, self-sustaining production units. The downfall 
of the cooperatives came when the government decided to credit 
the sale of goods by .the cooperatives toward the repayment of 
their loan debt. The result was that the credit agency, rather 
than the members, received the money from the crop sales, and 
that the cooperative members therefore literally received no money 
from: the marketing of their harvests. As a result, they refused to 
plant. They now see themselves as "on stri-ke" against the govern­
ment, and as resisting the government's attempts to "make us into 
slaves who work without being. paid, 11 in the words of one member. 
As another went on to say: 
We were .warriors and we were freedom fighters, We shall never 
be any person's slave. We fought against even Mwata when he 
fook money from us. We chased the British. And we will fight 
any government which tries to make us poor. 
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While not slaves, neither are they cash-crop farmers. The attempt 
by the government to generate rural incomes by establishing cooperative 
societies in Kasumpa village has failed. 
The Farmers 
Ten of the villagers had turned to farming. Four had been 
farmers in the p reindependence period; six entered production 
in 1965, the year after independence in Zambia. They did so because 
they had heard that the new government was going to support farming 
in the rural areas and that they could earn money through agricultural 
production. They, too, have been disappointed. And much of the 
blame for their failure they attribute to the government. 
While the cooperatives had ceased production in 1971, the 
farms continued to plant; and this enabled a .closer assessment of the 
actual functioning of the farms. In general, inspection revealed that 
their operations were such that farming could not generate significant 
rural incomes; and the performance of the governmental bureaucracies 
almost ensured that it could not. 
As we have argued, the primary ecological attributes affecting 
cash-crop production in Kasumpa are its remoteness from the urban 
markets and t!:ie presence of tl'letse fly. Remoteness, we argued, has 
caused farm operations -to depend overwhelmingly on the performance 
of governmental bureaucracies; while created to offset the absence ·of 
significant markets in the rural areas, these bureaucracies operated in 
a way. that failed to generate profits. The second attribute -- the presence 
of tsetse fly -� has meant that, in the absence of tractor power, farming 
is done on small acreages. Both ecological factors conspire to 
undermine the profitability of farming. 
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In the absence of competitive private markets, the independent 
farmers, in purcha.sing inputs and marketing produce, confront the same 
set of bureaucratic hurdles as did the cooperative societies, But, while 
the cooperatives had access to loan money from the department of 
cooperatives itself, the independent farmers could secure loan funds 
only from the government's credit agency. To secure these loans, 
the farmers had first to receive the backing of the agricultural 
extension worker. And in order to gain his recommendation, the 
farmers had to follow his advice. Only by so doing would the extension 
agent promote the farmer's loan application by certifying that the farmer 
is "an eager learner" and one who follows "approved farming practices. 11 
To secure loans, the farmers must therefore plant in time; 
they must space and thin their crops properly; they must use the 
recommended fertilizers and pesticides, and do so in the approved 
amounts. But above all, the farmers must grow maize. For the 
agricultural extension worker has been instructed that for new farmers 
in remote areas, maize is the best crop to grow. Of the available 
crops, maize is _the least complex to cultivate, and so can be easily 
grown by inexperienced farmers; and it is easily stored and transported, 
and so can be grown in areas distant from consumer markets. And 
besides, the agricultural department is responsible in governmental 
circles for protecting Zambia's balance of payments by reducing maize 
imports, and so has made increa,sed maize production a primary 
administrative target. Extension workers, eager for promotion, 
therefore encourage maize production. 
The trouble is that the price of maize is low; without high 
yields, in the range of 12, to 15 bags an acre at the prevailing, prices 
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in 1972, maize is simply not very profitable on small acreages. 
The mean _acreage worked by the Kasumpa farmers is small, however 
(4.36 acres; 1.16 acres standard deviation) and so the farmers, in 
order to finance their enterprises, are being constrained by bureau­
cratic practices to farm unprofitably. 
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The principle reasons for the small a creages are again the 
remoteness of the farms and the presence of tsetse fly. As we· indicated, 
after independence, the government distributed 23 tractors in Kawambwa 
distr i ct to promote farming in the area; by the end of 1 97 1 ,  however ,  
less than half were working, and even these tended to arrive a t  the 
farms late and fail to plough on time. In the remote districts, distant 
from mechanical workshops, supplies of parts,  and pools of trained 
artisans, it was nearly impossible to keep the tractor fleet in operation; 
and in distant areas , where the supplying of tractor services did not 
take place through competitive markets , it was almost impossible to 
p roperly allocate these services to farmers, The . result was that most 
farmers la cked mechanical ploughing, and their acreages were small. 
Nor, be cause of the absence of cattle, could the farmers extend their 
a creages through animal power. R athe r ,  they had to use hoes, and 
this meant that they worked four to five acres. 
In 1 972, the Kasumpa farmers achieved an average yield of 
9, l l bags of maize per acre. By growing groundnuts, which sold at
half again the price of maize, bananas , and vegetables (tomatoes , 
beans , onions , and cabbage), they managed to increase their earnings 
to an ave.rage total of Kl2 5 . 80. Assuming that they worked an average 
of 57.90 man days per acre -- which is what the average· far
_
mer worked, 
a c co r ding to the government's research in the area1�- this in eHect
meant that the farmers could have done as well by undertaking the 
lowest paid form of labor in Zambia - - agri cultural labor , at 50 ngwee 
a day. In effect, had they worked for other farmers rather than 
far ming themselves , their income woul.d .have been the sa1ne. 
The farmers are aware that their earnings are small and 
that the size of their earnings is limited by the low value of their 
p rincipal produ ct, As a result , they have attempted to shift production 
from ma ize to bananas and vegetable s ,  For comparable acreages, 
given relative .prices, bananas and vegetables can yield greater 
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profits than maize. But two major factors have limited the ability 
of the far mers to adjust their production to the relative profitability 
of these commodities. For one , the farmers were constantly 
pressured by the extension agents, who continued to require in­
flated maize targets as a condition for seasonal loans. And, for 
anothe r, the alternative crops to maize are highly perishable, and 
so had to be marketed locally to villagers and to neighboring institutions 
a hospital and secondary school. In marketing locally, the farmers
confronted several problems. They found that they had little control 
over the local market and so were vulnerable to the entrance of new 
suppliers. In the case of tomatoes, for example, the villagers have 
learned to grow them and the farmers have lost both the village market 
and a portion of the market at the local institutions. Moreover, the 
institutions increasingly contracted with bulk suppliers, For example, 
they pur chased bulk deliveries from a large, government-sponsored 
vegetable scheme in the district capital. Bulk pur chases simplified 
their pur chasing and got reduced prices. Moreover, the large-scale 
prod1,1cers provided their own transport - - something the village 
farmers could not do - - and the institutions saved in transport costs 
as well. 
The far me rs therefore had a difficult time in shifting pro­
duction into higher priced commodities. One result, as we have 
seen, was low earnings. Another was indebtedness. Like the 
cooperatives, · the farmers w_ere going into debt. Their earnings 
simply were not sufficient to pay back the loans which they did secure, 
with the result that, on average, they now owed K493.33 to the govern ­
ment, or the equivalent to the value of fou r seasons' annual produ ction 
at 1972 levels anq prices, As with the cooperatives ,  the government has 
now begun to credit to its loan agency the proceeds of the farmers 1 sales 
to its marketing organization; the fa rmers re ceive nothing from these 
sales; In addition,  as the following letter makes clear, the government 
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intends to collect its debts: 
13 December 197 1 
To all Farmers • . .  : 
Farmers who have sold . . .  bring your money here. You 
know that you have credit . . .  ; so that's why I ask you to 
bring your money. If you have not given this money, I will 
ask the government to help us in selling your goods: gardens, 
houses, and even your live stocks. 
Supervisor in Charge 
Agricultural Finance Company, Ltd. 
Nchelenge District 
The farmers are not making substantial profits; indeed, they have run 
up substantial debts, and the government is beginning to recover these 
debts from the farmers. Peasant farming, like work in the party and 
cooperative farming, does not generate substantial eaonomic rewards. 
The attempts by the public sector to promote the incomes of the village 
residents failed to bear fruit in Kasumpa village. We now turn to a 
discussion of the response of the villagers to this failure. 
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III 
THE RESPONSE OF THE VILLAGERS TO 
THE FAILURE OF THE DEVEL OPMENT PROGRAMS 
The Political Response 
One response has been political apathy. This response 
characterizes some of the former leaders of the nationalist move­
ment who have failed to derive significant benefits from their political 
labors and now have shifted their efforts elsewhere, An example of 
this is a former chairman of one of the local party branches, who in 
1970 resigned the post which he had held since the mid- 1950's. 
"I was fed up," he stated, "we were getting nowhere. Many 
others in the organization had got jobs, and I was just sitting 
idle. For me, it had been of no worth. " 
Politics, for him, had not· paid off. He no longer works at politics, 
but instead makes and sells baskets, helps build roofs on village houses, 
and fashions window and door frames, using the skills he acquired as 
a young labor migrant in the city. Not only is this man apathetic, 
however; he is a1so resentful. Speaking of the members of parliament 
whom he had helped put into power, he comments: 
The only reason any member of parliament c.omes here is to make 
campaigns. Other times, they are enjoying themselves with the 
money we got them. They are eating well; they have big cars. 
These are from America, and when someone is in it, we can't 
see him and he just looks blue. If they see a person walking or 
on a bicycle, they just chase them off the road and cover him 
with dust. When a man is fighting for a position, he cooperates 
with other people. Once in that position, then he is no good. 
Come tim.e for elections, though, and they will come promising 
things. 
The resentment expressed by the former branch chairman ie wide­
spread in Kaeumpa. ·Frequently it transforms into protest, as the villagers 
26 
attempt to alter the behavior of the public officials upon whom so 
much of their welfare depends, Most often, the villagers register 
their resentment when officials enter the village to inspect ongoing 
programs, to announce new public policies, or to engage in periodic 
meetings with the village headman and party officials. Thus, for 
example, in 197 1, the president of the Republic appointed a new 
district governor; upon taking up his new post, the governor sought 
to familiarize himself with the villages in his area. He received 
a hostile reception in Kasumpa. Why, he was asked, had ploughing 
again failed? Why had the loans been late? Did he not see how the 
young men had left the villages for town; and did he not realize had 
the farmers been made rich, these men could then have worked at 
home? In particular, the villagers criticized the local extension 
agent, whom they blamed for the general failure of cooperative and 
peasant farming; and the new district head, to recoup his standing, 
had the agent transferred, He also initiated a "commission of inquiry" 
into the conduct of the credit and marketing organizations -- a move 
that was widely acclaimed. 
In addition to subjecting public officials to verbal abuse -­
something that has earned Kasumpa village considerable notoriety 
in. governmental circles -- the villagers also prates t through· the use 
of votes. As the quotation from the former branch chairman suggests, 
the villagers are aware that they possess a valuable resource -- their 
electoral support -- which they can exchange for the attention and 
service!! of elected officials. Twice they have acted on this realization. 
In the local council elections after independence, for example, they 
threatened to ·stay away from the polls in protest over the location of 
a road. One of the first programs· the government undertook after 
independence was the building of a road along the floor of the Luapula· 
Valley, named ".Zambia Highway. 11 The villagers discovered that 
the government planned to locate the road several miles from Kasumpa 
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so as to cross the neighboring streams above the swamps near Kasumpa; 
the villagers realized that the new road would therefore not improve 
their access to the hospital. and secondary school which lay across the 
swamps, and so would be of little benefit to them, They therefore 
petitioned to have the road re-sited, And they adopted a new political 
slogan, "no road, no vote, 11 and threatened to withhold support from 
government candidates in the upcoming elections. The government 
was compelled to alter its plans and to construct a causeway so that 
the road could cross the swamps. 
Equally as serious was the attempt by several Kasumpa 
villagers in 1972 to affiliate with the United Political Party (UPP), 
an opposition party formed by the former national Vice President, 
Simon Kapwepwe. A small group of village party leaders (who held 
top positions in one of the cooperative societies) made contact with UPP 
officials on the copperbelt. They secured propaganda leaflets and 
membership cards and began to proselytize on behalf of the party. 
As one of them stated: 
The present government regards us as goats who can just eat 
the grass. We are suffering. During the struggle they 
promised us that there would be no more poor people and 
that we would be rich, It is seven years and we are still 
poor. 
Citing in particular the failure of the cooperative societies, he went 
on to say: "It is now the same as the colonial government. We must 
turn out the government. Even if we fail, they will have to try to 
make us happy. Otherwise others will follow us and they will lose 
power. 11 Before they could organize their party, the local leaders 
heard of the banning .of UPP and the arrest of many of its officials. 
Their contacts in town, they learned, were in jail; they feared to 
carry on their e fforts lest they too be imprisoned, Nonetheless, by 
threatening electoral opposition, they had registered their displeasure 
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a t  the failure of public institutions to upgrade the ir well-being and had 
attempted to elicit more attention and .better performance from the 
government.  
Electoral opposition and vocal protest were but two of the 
political techniques used by the villagers. They also contributed to 
the establishment and maintenance of the primary form of rural 
dissent in Zambia: provincialism in politics. Thus, for example , 
the village party officials subscribed -- literally - - to the following 
declaration, issued by the regional body of the governing party: 
The owners of this province suffered a lot in getting independenc e .  
Many suffered, many went t o  prison, many died. Since indepen­
d ence the government has done nothing in this province, . . . 
Before independence we were united together with other provinces, 
but since then other provinces nave wanted the lion's share and 
to eat off the heads of their friends, , . .  In Northern Province, 
government has established a railway lin e ,  , , , and so we want 
mines in Luapula Province, 1 5  
In addition t o  mines, the politicians also d emanded the radical upgrading 
of road links with the Copperbelt, the more rapid releasing of loans, and 
the construction of food processing plants so as to guarantee a demand 
for agricultural production in the area and so as to generate employment. 1 6  
I n  .addition to demanding greater allocations, the local politicians 
also sought the devolution of financial and bureaucratic authority to 
the provindal level. This was particularly clear iil. the case of the allo 7 
cation of credit, where the lo cal politicians. sought to make the local 
credit officials accountable to the district authorities rather than to 
th ' . . L k l ?  d · h e ir superiors in usa a an ·in t e case of the allocation of finances, 
where they demanded that their provincial leaders have the power to 
author ize and spend funds for projects which were located in thei.r 
area. By concentrating resources. and authority at the local level, 
the vil lagers hoped that they could make the publ ic agencies more 
responsive to their needs, As one provincial politician stated, 
Our government has told us about decentralization • • •  so as 
to bring the government near to the people and have their 
problems dealt with on the spot, But yet this has not been a 
practice at all. Although we have a Provincial Cabinet 
Minister and Permanent Secretaries in the Provinces, still 
matters are referred to Lusaka for final approval, just as it 
was in the past, 1 8 
The lack of decentralization affects the villagers directly. Thus, 
when they demanded a better feeder road to their farms, they failed 
to get it  because the Ministry of Agriculture in Lusaka had lost the 
papers authorizing the release of funds for the project; had the 
provincial authorities their own money, the villagers believed, the road 
could have been taken care of. Also, when many of the villagers 
had labored on a proj ect at the hospital, they had had to wait for over 
five months for their pay; the checks had first to be cleared with t.he 
central ministries, and no one locally had funds, or the power to divert 
funds, to pay the workers. A similar delay was encountered in seeking 
compensation for the houses which were destroyed when building the 
road through the villag e .  
T h e  local villagers want the government t o  make greater allocations 
for the ir area. They want local officials to have greater resources and 
the authority to distribute them. By securing these things , they feel, 
the government will be made more responsive to their. needs . In 
making these demands the Kasumpa villagers helped to lay the foundations 
for provincialism in Zambia. Provincialism is at least in part a response 
by rural dwellers to the failure by government to generate increased 
.standards of rural well-being. 
The response of the Kasumpa villagers to the failure of the rural 
development effort is thus political in character, Given the past history 
of the villagers - - their level of involvement in the nationalist movement 
and of their expectations for e conomic rewards it is not surprising 
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that so mu ch of their rea ction should take a political form.
In addition, given that the government is the prime mover of their
local e c onomy, it is also not surprising that the villagers should exer t  
political pressur e  to secure their e conomic erids. 
The Kasumpa villagers respond in another way, however ,  
I n  addition to public action, they also utilize private means; and rather 
than seeking political solutions to the problem of low incomes, they 
seek to enhance their well-being through the economic marketpla c e .  
T h e  market they enter is the urban market for labor;  a n d  they do s o  
b y  migrating t o  the cities. 
The R esponse of Migration 
Migration to the cities has long taken place from the Luapula 
Valley. The opp o r tunities for migration are proximate and remunerative: 
the mining areas of the former Ka tanga Province of Zaire and the r ich 
copper mines of the copper belt in Zambia. The opportunities for urban 
employment first came· in Katanga, where the mines opened in the 
early 1 900's; later, in the 1920's and early 1 930's, Zambia 's mines 
came into production. In response to the c r eation of these urban markets 
for labor,  many men migrated, Of the 105 heads of households that I 
drew into my eample survey of Kasumpa Villag!'l,  86 or 8 1 . 9  percent had 
at one t ime or another migrated to town. Those who had migrated had 
average approximately two trips each and had remained in town for an 
average of 1 1 . 7  years. As can be seen from Table 2, the re was a s trong 
tendenc y  for those who first migrated in the early 1900's to have concen­
trated in the Z ai r ian labor market; while those who first migrated in 
the l 930's or later tended to have journeyed to Zambian employme.nt 
cente r s .  Urban migration has thus been a pervasive and persistent 
aspect of rural .life in Kasumpa. 
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TA BLE 2 
Place of Migration by Date of First Migration 
Pre - 1920- 1930- 1940- 1950-
1920 1 929 1 939 1 949 
Exclusively or Primarily 
to Zaire N 3 8 2 2 2 
Per�ent T o tal 3 7 . 5  40.0 10. 5 1 1. 7 9. 5 
Equally to Zaire and 
to Zambia N 0 0 0 
Percent Total 1 2. 5  o . o  5. 2 o . o o . o  
Exclusively or Prima r ily 
to Zambia N 4 1 2  1 6  1 5  1 9  
Percent Total 50.0 60.0 84. 2 8 8 . 2  90.5 
T OTAL 8 20 19 1 7  2 1  
. The motivations for migration t o  town are straightforward: 
the desire for jobs and money. Thus, when asked what they liked most 
about town, the sample of Xasumpa .heads of households gave the following 
replies: 
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TABLE 3 
Answers to the Question: What Do You L ike Mos t  About Living in 'l'own? 
L ike town because: 
Jobs and Money 
Can get money with more leisure 
High Standard of living (e. g. , more 
stores, more conveniences , etc , ) 
Can Stay with children there 
No jealousy of wealth there 
Don 't  like town, because: 
Too old to work in town 
Without a job, cannot live there 
No Opinion / No experience in town recently 
'l'O'l'AL 
Number 
48 
4 
10 
3 
2 
2 
35 
105 
Percent 
45. 7 
3 , 8  
9.5 
2. 8 
1. 9 
1. 9 
0. 9 
33.3 
99. 8 
Forty - s ix percent cited the availability of employment and earnings as 
the most attractive a spects of urban life, while the answers of nearly two 
thirds noted basically economic factors as the mos t  attractive qualities 
of town. 
People in Kasumpa, for decades, have thus gone to town for 
economic r easons; and, g iven the rate of development that has taken 
place in the towns of Zambia s ince the time of independen ce, it is not 
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surprising that many continue to migrate from the village, Contributing 
to the level of migration from Kasumpa has been the failure of public 
programs to enhance the levels of village incomes, The villagers have 
seen the failure of the cooperatives, the indebtedness of the. farmers, 
and the end of the era in which it in fact paid to belong to the nationalist 
party. 'l'hey know that there are few income opportunities in the v illage. 
And so they seek through the labor market to deploy their efforts to the 
more productive sector of the national e conomy, and thereby secure 
higher incomes . 'l'hus, as one young man stated prior to leaving for 
town: "I am happy in the village; only, there is no employment here, 
The government should have g iven money so that we could find ways to 
support ourselves. " And, as recorded in my notes of a discussion with 
several young men of the village, all of whom planned to migrate: 
- - - - - - said: "My parents have not enough money to feed 
themselves , , . and I know that my brothers in Ndola and Lusaka, 
who have jobs, can provide, , . , And so I am leaving. My parents 
consent to thi s ,  " 
- - - - - - said: "I see no profit here , The work is very hard, 
'l'he people have a low s tandard of living. There is no industry 
to provide jobs and farming yields no profit. " 
His friends joined him at this point, s aying that even his father 's 
elder brother , , , who works hard as a farmer is still li.;,ing 
poorly. "We would prefer to stay , " they said, "but then, there 
is no money here, " 
Urb!ln migration is not merely an escape from the rural to the 
urban centers, however. It is an imp.ortant source of rural income as 
well. Rural dwe llers benefit from the placement of children and relatives 
in urban employment; for they can utilize the family network to extra ct 
· resources from their family members abroad in the city. Illustrative of
this is tha t the members of my sample0 of 105 heads of households in
Kasumpa village reported receiving an average of K 20. 23 in money 
payments from their children in town during the previous year; not inc luded
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in this total is the value of gifts in kind, such as househol d  wares, 
food, and clothing. From their sib and the sib i)f their wives who were 
abroad in town, the heads of households reported receiving, on average , an 
additional K9. 4 0  in cash, Again, the f igure does not include the value 
of gifts in kind, and so is an underestimate of the level of payments 
received from urban k inship sources, 
The Kasumpa villagers utilize urban migrants to increase their 
level of well-being. To demonstrate this, we can .relate the levels of 
remittances re ceived by the heads of households over the last year to 
two measures of well-being, The f irst is an index of the physical
ih
"
. 
charac teristics of the villagers' homes. Some homes contained an 
armchair with stuffed cushions, a table with a cloth on it, and photographs 
or calendars on the wall; some even had an iron roof or windows .with 
glass, The presence or absence of these items allows us to construct 
what we call a household score. Our second index of well- being is based 
upon the durable goods possessed by the heads of household; we label this 
the ownership s core.  The ownership s core is based upon the possession, 
or la ck of it, of a radio, · a  b i cycle , or a sewing machine. 
The significance of cash remittances for the well-be.ing of the 
villagers can be inferred f rom the significance of the relationship 
between the values of these two indices and the level of remittances 
received f rom town. 
[Table 4 here] 
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Between Remittances and Indices of Wel l -being 
Value of Value of 
Remittances Remittances 
From Children .From Sib 
Household Score 
Correlation coeffi cient , 25 83 . 33 19 
Number of cas�s 105 10 5  
Level o f  significance , 0 04 , 0 0 1  
Ownership Score 
Correlation coeffi c ient . 1899 . 16 7 7  
Number o f  cases 105 105 
Level of significance . 0 26 , 044 
The correlations between the value of the remittances from 
children and the sib , and the household index of well -being a re both 
s i gnif i cant beyond the , 0 1  level; the levels of significance for the cor ­
relations between the levels o f  remittances and the ownership s core 
are Jess impressive , but both are significant at the . 05 level and the 
relationships do run in the ' ' right" direction - - i . e. increases in the 
level of remittances are associated w ith increases in the measure of 
well-being . 
The importance of urban mig ration for the level of rural well­
being is also suggested by the relationship between various measures 
bf the level of migration from the sampled households and the values . 
of the household index for the homes of these families. We obt;;_in the 
following correlation coeff icients and significance levels (Table 5) , 
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TABLE 5 
Correlation Between Levels of Migration and Household Index 
No. of Live No. of Live Total Va lue of 
No. of L ive Children Children in Gifts From 
No. of Live Children Employed Town Remitting Children in Town 
Children in Town in Town Gifts Last Year 
Correlation 
coefficient . 1 1 19 . 1 60 5  . 1 869 . 20 1 1  . 2 5 53 
Number of 
cases 105 1 0 5  105 105 1 0 5  
Level 6£ 
significance . 25 6  . 1 0 2  .056 .040 . ,009 
In Kasumpa village, some heads of household take advantage 
of urban migration to a greater extent than do others • .  The primary 
determinant of the difference appears to be the social stage .;f life of 
the sampled h�ad of household. Thus, we find that an important determinant 
of the difference is simply family size (Table 6). 
(Table 6 here J 
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TABLE 6 
Family Size as a Determinant of Level of Migration from Household 
Total Number 
L ive Children 
in Town 
Total . Number 
L ive Children 
Employed in 
Town 
Total Number 
L ive Children 
Making Remittances 
From Town 
T o tal Number L ive Children 
Correlation Coefficient 
Number of Cases 
Level of Significance 
. 45 16 
105 
.001 
. 3 4 10 
105 
.001 
. 25 10 
105 
.005 
The larger the number of children, the greater the number of children 
in town, the numbe r employed in town, and the numbe r sending back 
remittances .  It is thus apparent that villagers with es tablished house­
holds, and so larger numbers of children, are better able to extrac t  
resources from urban sources than are villagers w h o  have y e t  to 
e s tablis h families. 
We also find a relations hip between the cas h  earnings of the
v illagers and their tendency to extract res ources from urban dwelling 
offspring, As the following table of correlation coefficients s ugges ts, 
the greater the .estimated average annual cas h  earnings of the sampled 
heads of household, the fewer the number of children in town, the fewer 
the number of children employed in town, and the fewe r the number of 
children making remittances. 
.TABLE 7 
Correlation Between Levels of Migration 
, sind Average Annual Cash Jfarnings 
Average Annual 
Cash Ear.nings 
Ccirrelation C oefficient 
Number of Cases 
Level of Significance 
Number of 
Live Children 
in Town 
- . 1 9 1 5  
9 1  
•
 03 5 
Number of 
Live Children 
Employed 
in Town 
- , 1 6  71 
9 1  
• 057
3 8  
Number of  
Live Children 
Remitting Gifts 
From Town 
- . 2 1 26 
9 1  
. 0 2 2  
I t  is, b y  and large, the younger men who can generate cash 
in the village. They are the ones who tend to help build and roof 
houses; who prepare extra gardens and sell the surplus crops; and who 
journey out to unsettled areas in search of grass and bamboo to sell as 
roofing materials. Their energy and strength allow them to earn money 
from these rural sources; and their vigor is an advantage that the older 
men lack, Rather, the advantage of the older men lies in their established 
families and the numbers of their children, For it is this resource which 
enables them to extract resources ·from the urban areas. 
There is another way of looking at our findings. We have found 
that families which are rich, in a cash sense, are less involved in the 
migration process; whe reas those who are rich in a "real" sense, that 
is in terms of their possessions, are much more involved in migration, 
And we have interpreted these .findings in terms of the stage of  life of 
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the heads o f  households, suggesting that young men just founding families 
are cash rich and child poor, while old men are cash poor but child rich, 
and therefore in receipt of gifts from town. This analysis is in keeping 
With the· Kasumpa villagers' own understanding of their family -structure 
and the migration process, and it suggests a process of human investment, 
The Kasumpa villagers want children; they expect to spend a 
}ot of money on their children; and they expect, in return, to be supported 
by their children when they reach old age. Labor migration, by which 
children are exported to the richer urban areas and their increased 
earnings then drawn upon by the older generation, is perfectly adaptable 
to this process of intergenerational support within the family system. 
Such a view of the role of children is widely shared in Kasumpa. 
Many of the villagers felt they were dependent upon their children in 
the copperbelt. Thus, when asked about visiting town, one villager 
replied: "I enjoy it, as my children are well employed there, So when 
I visit, I get clothes, " Later, when asked about what, if anything, he 
disliked about life in the village, he replied: "Nothing, for my children 
support me in many of my problems. If I had no children in the copper­
belt, I would suffer. There would be no money even to raise one acre 
of groundnu ts. 11 In response to a la ter question, he averred :  "I cared 
for my children and now they care for me, 1 1  • And when asked his opinion 
about intertribal marriage in town, he declared his oppos ition to it; for 
"when it is time for the family to go back to the rural areas, the wife 
and man will separate and he will lose his children. " This man, like 
other Kasumpa villagers, clearly s aw his children in town as a critical 
economic resource. 
'I'o win financial support from the children, however, involves 
a heavy cash expenditure, and for two basic reasons. For one, the 
children, to earn good incomes in the urban areas and thereby to become 
remunerative, must be well educated, and this involves expenditures 
for school fees and uniforms, For another, to retain the affection of
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the children, the parents have to spend money on the possessions which 
will enable their children to lead an agreeable life in the village. As the 
K asumpa people state, the social habits of the towns have entered the 
r ural a reas, and town life is expensive. Thus, the children expect to 
be provided with good clothes, so that they can "make a good appearance" 
among their friends. They expect to have pocket money so that they can 
buy soft drinks and sweets, and even, perhaps, bottled beer at the local 
groceries. They expect to have access to a bicycle and some want 
gramaphones. Some feel they need football uniforms. And some even 
want, and get, separate houses, which they can paint up and furnish, 
and in which they study after school and entertain their friends, joining 
their parents at their natal home only for meals . To fulfill these expectations 
takes money; and the parents do try to purchase these things. For if they 
do not, they r e alize that their children may well take recourse to their 
network of kin and join a related family in t_own - - a family with the money 
to suppo r t  them in their youth, and thereby purchase their later support 
in return. 
To illustrate this kind of thinking, I can again quote my notes 
from a discussion with some young men: 
They all agreed that the thing they do mos t  is to play: football, 
cards, talking, and looking for girls. They say the only time 
they have to work is at ploughing time and then they work in the 
fields only fo.r a little while . E s s entially, though, they have few 
r esponsibilities and their parents appear to force no r esponsibilities 
upon them. 
One lad was city bound, and he had a few interesting things to say. 
He said that he had made overt conditions for staying with his 
parents. The main one was that his parents provide the things he 
needs, Most impor tant was clothes, But also, he needed money 
fo r entertainment, a bicycle, and a record player. But he saw 
that his parents did not have the money . . •  to provide these 
things . • • .  And so he is leaving . 
The parents who lack money lose their children to urban-based kin; 
and only by graciously affirming thefr child ren 's right to leave do the 
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parents have a chance of. r etaining their affection and love, and s o  their 
future financial support. But those parents who do have cash must spend 
it in order to retain the allegiance of their children and thereby their 
future financial support. By spending their money on the children, they 
can thereby conver t  their cash into social credit, which later can be 
drawn upon in order to achieve material well-being. 1 9  
Interpreting our findings in this way leads u s  to appreciate how 
the Kasumpa villagers utilize the family as a means for extracting 
resources from the city. Through the family and the urban market 
for labor, the villagers attempt to achieve private solutions to the 
problems .of their position of disadvantage in contemporary Z a mbia 
and to the failure of public programs to significantly upgrade their 
standard of living. 
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to the process of learning that has taken place since that time by 
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3.  Treating these topics entails ignoring others, ·  Thus, there was · 
in the village a .successful building cooperative; but only three 
villagers were directly involved with it at the time of the study, and 
so it was of little consequence for most villagers. Secondly, there 
was the fishing industry from which nearly 30 percent of the villagers 
either directly or indirectly derived their incomes, But the govern­
ment had done little to promote or enhance this industty since 
independence ; and we atte mpt to analyze here the fate of public 
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in a later , book-length ·study. 
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1 9 .  We are h e re interpreting observations made at one point in time 
in terms of an argument about processes that take place over time . 
Naturally, we never saw a child of 1 1 ,  who received new clothing 
from his fathe r ,  turn 3 5  and then mail his fathe r a sewing machine; 
r ather,  from observations made at one point in time, we infer red 
that this kind of process was taking place.  Such temporally based 
interpretations should, of course, be based on data gathered from 
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